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ABSTRACT 
 
JIE SHEN: Russia’s Blueprint for a Nuclear Energy Renaissance: 
Its Domestic Policy and International Role 
(Under the direction of David McNelis) 
 
 Russia’s economy and energy security could not rely solely on oil and gas for the 
long-term strategy based on their economic dependence, geologic availability, and reserve 
policies. This thesis answers why and with what percentage will nuclear power take part in 
Russia’s future energy portfolio, draws political indications from the interface of Oil & 
Gas—Economy—Nuclear—Policy. By doing Stakeholder and S.W.O.T. Analyses, nuclear 
power is the most reasonable choice to diversify Russia’s energy portfolio. The predicted role 
of nuclear power by 2020 is indicated herein by its percentage out of the country’s projected 
total electricity output, which is plotted from the Russian GDP and Electricity Output 
regression model. The percent range from 21.2% to 25.9% is calculated by a Russian nuclear 
electricity output equation. Concomitantly with a significant increase in nuclear power 
implies needs for aggressive fuel and technology policies and Rosatom’s financial 
preparedness needs to be affirmative. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Being the world's leading gas exporter and one of its largest oil exporters, Russia has 
become one of the most attractive emerging energy markets in the world. Russia has 
experienced a remarkable economic revival over the past decade, especially during Putin’s 
administration. Based on the real GDP growth data of Russia, the average annual growth has 
been high, hovering around 7%. In 2008, Russia's GDP grew an estimated 6.0%1. In the 
second half of 2008, however, the global financial crisis and a steep fall in the price of oil 
slowed Russia’s economy significantly. The roughly 1% drop in GDP growth indicated an 
imbalance in the structure of Russia’s economy—the country depends greatly on its natural 
resource exportation for its economic growth. The President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, 
has addressed in a recent speech that “achieving leadership by relying on oil and gas markets 
is impossible 2 ”. This structure, dependent mainly on the exportation of those two 
commodities, would not be expected to be stable with the historical fluctuation of oil and gas 
prices; the relatively weak sustainability to serve as a long-term solid mainstay of export; the 
lack of diversity in product forms; and the great potential to raise multiple political issues. 
                                                        
1
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “CIA - World Factbook - Russia.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rs.html. 
 
2
 Dmitry Medvedev. “Go Russia!” President of Russia Speeches, September 10, 2009. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml. 
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Before discussing the weaknesses of the Russian energy-economy structure, the 
question of the role of the energy sector, especially the oil and gas part, in the Russian 
economy should be addressed. Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on oil and natural gas 
exports. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank estimates, the oil 
and gas sector generated more than 60 percent of Russia’s export revenues (64% in 2007) 3, 
leaving the country particularly vulnerable to swings in world prices. In the 2003 Summary of 
the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of Up to 20204 prepared by the Ministry of the 
Russian Federation is noted that the government set aims, tasks and guide lines for a long-
term State energy policy and phases of its realization. It is stated in the summary that the 
energy strategy will be carried out in two phases. By the end of the first phase (2009-2010), 
the two most important scenario objectives are: 
 
1) “the realization of the export potential of oil and gas complex and attainment of 
stable positions of energy companies at the internal and external fuel and energy 
markets; 
 
2) the transition from the impellent role of the fuel and energy complex in Russian 
economy to the role of an effective and stable supplier of fuel and energy 
resources for needs of economy and population.”5 
 
From these two objectives in the first phase, it is apparent that Russia has great confidence in 
the export potential of its oil and gas complex, and is ready to develop it to play a relatively 
                                                        
3
 Energy Information Administration (EIA). “Russia Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis – Oil, Gas, Electricity, Coal.” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Russia/Background.html. 
 
4
 The Ministry of the Russian Federation. Summary of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of Up to 
2020 (Moscow, 2003), 3. 
 
5
 ibid., 3. 
 3
dominant and necessary role in the internal economy and civil needs of Russia as well as its 
external markets. 
For the second phase, objectives include “rapid use of the existing odds (opportunities) 
in nuclear power and hydro energy sectors, coal industry; … abrupt increase of contribution 
of the scientific and technical and innovation potential to the Russian energy sector; creation 
of basis for a substantial increase of the renewable share in the forthcoming period and 
transition to the energy of the future6”. 
This phase has shifted into a higher level of diversifying the energy sector as 
compared to the first phase. Among all the energy forms planned for further development, 
only nuclear energy and the coal industry have solid foundations already established since 
Soviet times. Other innovations in energy forms including renewables are still highly 
underdeveloped in Russia. 
In this thesis, discussions will be based on a four dimensional conceptual model of 
major Russian energy-economy relationships: 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A comprehensive Oil & Gas—Economy—Nuclear—Policy model would in reality, be vast 
and complex. Therefore, for analytical convenience and focused analysis, only relationships 
                                                        
6
 ibid., 4. 
 4
marked by arrows in this model are developed for illustration in the following chapters. 
During the past ten years, Russia’s economy was boosted greatly by its internal and 
external oil and gas markets. At the same time, the country and the world have been 
experiencing fluctuating prices of oil and gas and related regional political issues. And it is 
widely recognized that these two resources will eventually run out. Under these 
circumstances and the influence of various other factors and variables not treated in this 
thesis, the economy needs more sustainable, high-tech, high value-added energy products to 
provide the base-load capability for its domestic market. Nuclear-provided electricity is one 
resource that, along with its related services, would help to secure and diversify the economy 
and provide base-load power. When achieving this, government involvement will be deep 
and dominant in Russia. Therefore, several major policies could have impacts on the process 
of nuclear energy development. These policies cover the concerns of population, nuclear 
technologies and services, uranium availability, environmental issues, public acceptance, and 
financial readiness. The synergies and tradeoffs among these policies will have important 
effects on the development of nuclear energy. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
OIL & GAS—ECONOMY 
 
Based on this conceptual model, a discussion of the four aspects mentioned at the end 
of first paragraph of the Introduction, which answer the question of why the current energy-
economy structure is not stable or healthy for the long term, can be developed. This addresses 
the relationship between the first two elements in the conceptual model: oil & gas—economy. 
The four issues that suggest an economy heavily dependent on oil and gas is not a 
very stable structure are: 
 
1) the fluctuation of oil and gas prices; 
2) relatively weak ability to serve as a long-term mainstay for export; 
3) lack of diversity in product forms; 
4) and great potential to give rise to multiple political issues. 
 
2.1 Fluctuation of Prices 
 
The first issue relates to the global fluctuating oil and gas prices. As observed for the 
past year, the price of crude oil in the international market has experienced a huge up-and-
down from the highest price of 147 dollars per barrel7 in the summer of 2008 to the low of 
nearly 30 dollars per barrel8 after the financial crisis in the Fall of 2008. As we look into the 
                                                        
7
 BBC News. “Oil hits new high on Iran fears.” BBC News, July 11, 2008. 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7501939.stm. 
 
8
 Energy Information Administration (EIA). “Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel).” EIA Petroleum 
Navigator, data retrieved on October 18, 2009. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rwtcd.htm. 
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numbers of GDP growth of Russia for the last five years (2004-2008), 7.2%, 6.4%, 7.4%, 
8.1%, 6.8%9, the 2008 data showed a dramatic drop of 1.3% from the 2007 growth. This drop 
in the annual GDP growth, according to the 2008 Russian President's Addresses to the 
Federal Assembly10, was mainly caused from the oil price breakdown. On the other hand, the 
economy revival experienced by the country since Putin’s administration was greatly driven 
by the unusually high oil price in the new century.  
The gas market was not in the same situation as the oil market, but prices still vary in 
a range for different countries or regions. Russia is the largest exporter of natural gas in the 
world and gas supply to Europe is mainly dependent on Russia. There are also multiple gas 
pipelines stretching into the Middle-East and Central and East Asia, and distant customers 
receive Russia’s gas through compressed shipments. Russia charges differently among 
customers, and usually the differences are not negligible. In 2006 for example, the most 
obvious differences were among Belarus, Ukraine, and the European Union. In 2006 Belarus 
paid only $46 per 1000 m³, a fraction compared to $290 per 1000 m³ paid by Germany11. 
Russia charged Belarus at a lower price for political reasons as it cannot afford to lose 
another former ally and close following the collapse of the Soviet Union12. Russia charged 
                                                        
9
 Russian GDP data is retrieved from World Bank. 
 
10
 Dmitry Medvedev. “Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.” President of Russia Speeches, 
November 5, 2008. http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2008/11/05/2144_type70029type82917type127286_208836.shtml. 
 
11
 People’s Daily. “Russia to adopt market gas price with Belarus from 2007.” People’s Daily, China, April 17, 2006. 
http://english.people.com.cn/200604/17/eng20060417_258874.html. 
 
12
 The annual Russian subsidies to the Belarusian economy were around $4 billion, as Russian president Vladimir Putin said 
on January 9, 2007. 
 7
Ukraine at about half of what the Europe paid13 because most of the pipelines that extend to 
the Europe and provide large earnings pass through Ukraine. Russia will not allow those low 
prices to exist for long as they obviously decrease the revenue from gas exporting. 
 
2.2 Weak Sustainability 
 
The second issue refers to the relatively weak sustainability of oil and gas to serve as 
a long-term solid mainstay for export. The fact that it took millions of years for oil and gas to 
form and accumulate beneath the ground they are considered non-renewable resources for 
foreseeable generations, and running out is just a matter of time. A conservative estimation of 
75 years for oil and gas to run out at today’s market prices is based on the same consumptive 
rate as present.14 But with the expansive usage of oil and gas into nearly every aspects of 
modern life, it is not as simple as an estimation based simply on reserves. Several other 
factors directly influence their sustainability: 
a) Technology used in oil refineries. Current technology invested into the oil industry 
is on a low level of extraction, i.e., around 30%15 from the oil-bearing formations. This 
allows the capital to profit easier and faster. Future consideration will include an optimization 
of investment for smaller and harder to get reserves using improved technology. This may 
                                                        
13
 Wikipedia. “Russia–Ukraine gas dispute of 2005–2006.” Wikipedia, retrieved on August 4, 2009. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93Ukraine_gas_dispute_of_2005%E2%80%932006. 
 
14
 World total oil proved reserve is 1,342.207 billion barrels; world total natural gas proved reserve is 6,254.364 trillion 
cubic feet. Data retrieved from Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 106.48 (Dec. 22, 2008), PennWell Corporation, except United States. 
Oil includes crude oil and condensate. Data for the United States are from the Energy Information Administration, U.S. 
Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves, 2007 Annual Report, DOE/EIA-0216(2007) (Feb. 2009). 
 
15
 Grenon, M.. “The world's oil resources.” Revue de l'Energie, vol. 27 (July-Aug. 1976): 372-377. 
http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1976RvEn...27..372G. 
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eventually provide an opportunity for alternative energy sources to bloom, which in turn will 
positively impacts oil sustainability. 
b) Challenges based on environmental considerations. Both oil and gas need a 
combustion process to realize their value as energy sources. Green House Gases (GHG) 
abatement has become a global issue since the Kyoto Protocol was formulated. Public 
awareness of the potential dire consequences of global warming and industrial interests in 
renewable technologies are pushing the agenda for GHG reductions to a higher level than 
ever. Thus, cleaner energy forms would occupy part of the existing fossil fuel market in the 
future, and that is when oil and gas might be expected to phase out gradually. 
c) Political considerations on energy security. Basically, countries and regions with 
different situations of resource conditions will face the problem of securing strategic energy 
reserves, which currently exists mostly in the form of oil and gas. At the same time, they are 
trying to develop multiple energy supply chains suited to their own advantages. The most 
famous example would be Iceland. In 2006, the country’s use of geothermal energy to 
contributed 26.5% of its total energy consumption, and hydro provided 73.4%. Fossil fuels 
contributed the remaining 0.1%16. Iceland is using almost all of its energy from sustainable 
renewable resources.  
All above three factors have a tendency to decrease the consumption of oil and gas. 
 
2.3 Lack of Diversity 
 
                                                        
16
 Orkustofnun (Iceland Energy Authority). "Energy Statistics in Iceland, 2007". http://www.os.is/solofile/20644. 
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A third issue is the lack of diversity in product forms and was the main motivation for 
this thesis. As was suggested in the Introduction chapter of this thesis, the Russian energy 
strategy was based on adding more choices into the energy portfolio. In Medvedev’s recent 
speech17, he identified five strategic vectors for the economic modernization of Russia, the 
first vector being to develop new fuels for use in domestic and international markets, and the 
second being to maintain and raise Russia’s nuclear technology to a qualitatively new level. 
As the simple rule of financial investment states, “Do not put all your eggs in one 
basket,” energy security needs to follow the same principle. During the first phase of Russia’s 
strategy, oil and gas are set to play major roles as both internal and external economy 
propellers, considering that Russia does not solely control the prices and is facing a future of 
eventually running out. Therefore, a third solid and sustainable component in the portfolio is 
urgently required. A recent trend in the EU to develop renewables like solar, wind, and clean 
coal technology can be viewed as an action for the same reason. What the EU faces ranges 
from a scarcity of natural resources to political consequences not even directly related to 
them (i.e.: the Russian-Ukraine gas dispute). The EU is now a leading role model in the 
world in implementing multiple energy strategies and developing a strong market for 
alternative energies. 
 
2.4 Political Issues 
 
The Russian-Ukraine gas dispute is a perfect example for the fourth issue of political 
                                                        
17
 Dmitry Medvedev. “Go Russia!” President of Russia Speeches, September 10, 2009. 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml. 
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conflicts and related to Russia’s current unstable energy-economy structure. The dispute was 
widely considered as driven by both economic and political purposes. The economic part was 
partly mentioned in the first issue as Ukraine had been paying a lower price to Russia for gas. 
But this unique problem has other facets as well. It was already the fourth dispute between 
the two countries. The two countries hold a bilateral intergovernmental annual negotiation 
framework of gas trading. Russia attempted to raise the price of gas for Ukraine to a market 
level; while Ukraine wrestles with Russia by charging high gas tariffs and transit fees to 
maintain the lower gas prices from Russia. Throughout post Soviet history, Ukraine has owed 
a large gas debt, and accused of non-payment and gas diversions by Russia. Russia cut off 
the gas supply to Ukraine in each dispute, and Europe became a third party victim in being 
cut off from gas supplies. This expanded the conflict from a bilateral one to a multiparty 
event. 
Under the current global financial crisis situation, Russia has been struck by the oil 
price drop which has significantly affected the country’s economy. Russia will require a debt 
reimbursement from Ukraine. There are other, sometimes historic drivers that contribute to 
the disputes: 
a) the most fundamental cause is Ukraine’s de-russification since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. For Russia, it does not want to lose Ukraine as being both a buffer and a bridge 
to the West. One of Russia’s strategies was to offer a relatively low price for gas to Ukraine 
in order to maintain the ties between the two. The price was set at $50 dollars per cubic meter 
when the market price was about $230. This was the situation before 2006, just two years 
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after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The revolution provided a strong signal of a firm 
step toward de-russification, and resulted in a change from a pro-Russian strategy into a pro-
Western one. 
b) The second driver relates to the EU and NATO relationships with Russia and 
Ukraine, Russia’s being essentially non-existent and the Ukraine’s becoming closer. Member 
countries of the EU and NATO are highly overlapped, 21 European countries are members of 
the two18. These two organizations are powerful entities that are challenging Russia on 
economic and national security issues. Geopolitically, Ukraine and Belarus serve as 
important buffers and bridges with these two organizations. In this case, the relationships of 
Russia to Ukraine and to Belarus have to be pro-Russian in the interest of Russia. Should 
Ukraine turn to EU and NATO, it will be a heavy blow to Russia’s interests and security. A 
recent example could be Ukraine’s attitude in the Russia-Georgia conflict in the summer of 
2008. Some Russian media’s accusation of Ukraine aiding Georgia with weapons could 
indicate a departure of Ukraine from Russia. On the other hand, Russia’s cutting off gas 
supplies to Ukraine provided a strong indication of Russia’s relation and a caution to Europe 
against accepting the Ukraine in the EU. There were 18 countries in Europe that were 
affected by the 2009 gas dispute19, and 12 out of the 18 were EU members. Another slightly 
different set of 13 countries were NATO members; while 11 were both EU and NATO 
                                                        
18
 Countries both in EU and NATO (20): Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and 
United Kingdom. 
 
19
 Countries hit by gas dispute in 2009 (18): Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. 
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members. While this action may not represent the main purpose of Russia’s firm stance in the 
dispute, it did send an obvious signal to Europe and the Ukraine that the balance of economic 
and political interests of Russia needs to be maintained. 
c) Another and even larger driver was that Russia was trying to gain more status in 
the emerging, OPEC-like organization of Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). At the 
end of 2008, the forum held its annual meeting since 2001 in Moscow, to discuss its proper 
regulations and name. The establishment of another formal gas exporting country 
organization will have an obvious impact on the international gas market. As the original 
organizer and the largest gas exporter, Russia is ambitious to gain the prominent position in 
the organization, more specifically, the right to set gas prices. This is not hard to understand 
and should not be hard to achieve once one takes a look at the list of members and 
observers20. The only former Soviet country that is included as one of two observers is 
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has abundant natural resources, particularly fossil fuels and uranium, 
which could provide an important strategic reserve supplement for Russia. Other members 
are located all over the world and do not include any EU nor NATO countries. Russia’s 
action toward Ukraine, which is trying to get into the Western circle, is definitely a warning 
signal to all and a declaration of its own image of an energy superpower. 
This fourth issue of political conflicts is the most unstable one among the four. It 
involves many parties and is actually an issue of energy being a tool for achieving political 
                                                        
20
 Countries in the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) (15+2): Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. 
Kazakhstan and Norway are observers. 
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interests. This is an unstable confounder in a purely theoretical model of energy-economy 
structure. Stated another way, political factors have taken up too much in an energy 
availability and sustainability problem. Thus, one or several energy forms having less 
political implications need to be introduced into the Russian energy portfolio. Specifically in 
this case, Ukraine may eventually become an antagonistic entity toward Russia which will 
still control the main pipeline from Russia to Europe. Russia cannot depend too much on the 
revenues through its Ukraine pipelines. GECF is a tentative try, but according to the 
characteristics of natural gas21, this organization might not achieve its function of setting the 
production and price of gas like the OPEC does for oil. 
 
These four issues that relate to the instability of Russia’s energy-economy structure 
have suggested the following requirements of change: 1) relative stable price; 2) large 
amount of demand; 3) abundance in reserve; 4) clean and environmental-friendly in use; 5) 
less politics involved. In Chapter 3, the question of what energy form best fits these 
requirements will be answered. 
 
                                                        
21
 Liquid natural gas (LNG) is uneconomical to store and requires immediate consumption at the end of the pipelines. The 
relation between supply and demand has its instantaneity, it is not intended to store in order to influence the price. Other than 
this, pipelines are large initial capital investments, and restrict its flexibility to dispatch on gas and on cash flows. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
WHY NUCLEAR? 
 
As mentioned at the end of Chapter 2, Russia needs new blood in its energy portfolio 
and several requirements were set to be met. Several choices of energy form is being 
compared in this chapter. The element of “nuclear” in the four dimension conceptual model 
will be discussed. 
As we see it is already a fact that Russia is moving steadily forward with plans for 
much expanded role of nuclear energy, at least doubling output by 2020. This requires a large 
increase in electricity capacity with an effective portfolio of energy sources. This chapter 
presents six major aspects of problem concerning the selections of new major energy form. 
By doing a stakeholder analysis matrix and a quantitative alternative S.W.O.T. analysis22 
based on criteria of various costs, benefits, and equity, robustness, this chapter concludes 
with an optimized plan of Russia’s portfolio of electricity. 
At present, Russia’s electricity is generated from three kinds of power plants. 
Roughly 63% from fossil fuel plants, 21% by hydropower and 16% comes from nuclear 
reactors23. Major part of the electricity generation is coming from the thermal plants. 
                                                        
22
 S.W.O.T Analysis is a strategic planning method used to evaluate the Strength, Weakness, Opportunities, and Threats 
involved in a project or business venture. This technique is credited to Albert Humphrey. 
 
23
 BBC News. “Russia: Energy overview.” BBC News, February 13, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4699942.stm. 
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Russia has an explicit objective of doubling gross domestic product within a decade24. 
Efficient and reliable electricity services will be critical to the success of this policy. 
Therefore, Russia will need to build more power plants to meet the demands. Under the 
global trends to initiate more clean and efficient power plants, Russia will have to create a 
responsible portfolio of electricity sources both for its domestic economy and the 
international society. 
 
3.1 Russia’s New Electricity Portfolio Obstacles 
 
The portfolio of electricity generation is a multidimensional decision that could be 
affected from various angles. Those angles are further affected by different country’s own 
condition. The following are aspects of the issue concerning Russia: 
 
3.1.1 Economy Condition 
 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained as the nucleus of a 
superpower. This superpower had developed its heavy industries and military industries to a 
historical height, under a secluded condition. After its collapse, what used to be the economic 
circulation within the Soviet Union would become, if it continued to happen, the form of 
exportation and importation between Russia and those former Soviet States. In this transition, 
resource circulation takes a major part of the contribution of Russia’s increase of exportation 
data, which is brought by the collapse of the Union. 
Russia, therefore, is a unique emerging market. Its exports are primarily resource 
                                                        
24
 International Energy Agency. Russian Electricity Reform - Emerging Challenges and Opportunities. OECD/IEA, 2005. 
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based. And Russia’s exports reached 20% in its GDP in the year of 200025. Payments from 
the fuel and energy sector in the form of customs duties and taxes accounted for nearly half 
of the federal budget's revenues26 . Among the exported resources, oil and gas take the 
majority. In fact, Russia is already the largest natural gas exporter and the third oil export 
entity after Saudi Arabia and the EU. Resource exports can bring the government large and 
steady revenue. 
Under this kind of economic situation, Russia would have to allocate major parts of 
its oil and gas extracts to the pipelines for exportation, rather than to bet its future increase of 
electricity capacity completely on new thermal plants by using a substantial part of its fossil 
fuel extracts. In another word, Russia has an economic driving tendency to make money from 
fossil fuel exportation for its country’s development, and that requires support from 
developing other electricity sources. 
 
3.1.2 Natural Restriction 
 
Russia though has the largest land area in the world; unfortunately, its territory is 
longitude-spread on a very high latitude range. This natural geography restriction results in a 
variety of disadvantage in developing alternative energy. 
High latitude area lacks sun shine in time duration and appropriate angle for solar 
energy. Low temperature in most area of Russia makes the soil non-cultivable even frozen 
                                                        
25
 Kommersant. “Rosstat Confirms Record GDP Growth.” Kommersant, Russia’s Daily Online, April 15, 2008. 
http://www.kommersant.com/p882678/r_527/macroeconomics/. 
 
26
 Wikipedia. “Economy of Russia.” Wikipedia, retrieved on August 4, 2009. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Russia. 
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permanently, this could be a problem for developing biomass fuel. These two every obvious 
disadvantage alone has taken away big part of mainstream alternative energy from Russia’s 
choice for its portfolio. 
 
3.1.3 Sustainability of Fuel Supply 
 
In respect to the fuel supply, the most important thing is to have a cheap, steady, 
controllable, self-sufficient source. 
For thermal plants, coal, oil and gas are adequate for current generations, but they are 
non-renewable energy resources that will eventually run out. As previously mentioned in 
Chapter 2, oil and gas reserve would last 75 years at current production rate in the world; and 
coal reserve would last 164 years at current production rate27. 
Situation for Russia is not better. In Table 1, estimated years to last for oil, gas, and 
coal based on Russia’s reserves and its annual consumption and production (including export) 
is calculated in the last column. Notice that based on current oil production rate of Russia, oil 
will run out in less than two decades, and coal will last longer than the world projection. 
 These estimations are based on recent data of world and Russian reserves. Different 
estimations may exist based on data of resources. Reserves are currently economically 
feasible; resources are currently or potentially economically feasible. They both answer the 
question of how much is left with geologic and economic considerations. Reserve can be 
viewed as subset of resources. The McKelvey Box simplifies this difference by identifying 
                                                        
27
 Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. Chapter 5: Coal, International Energy Outlook 2007. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), May 2007. 
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increasing geologic assurance (speculative / hypothetical / inferred / proved reserves) and 
economic feasibility (sub-economic "resources" as compared with economic "reserves" 
depending on price and cost levels and available extraction technologies).28 
 
Table 1: Sustainability Statistics for Russia’s Major Types of Energy Resource 
Resources Reserve29 Annual Consumption30 
Annual 
Production31 
Years Estimated 
(Consumption / 
Production) 
Oil 
(billion barrels) 60.00 1.10 3.33 55    /    18 
Gas 
(trillion cubic feet) 1680.00 16.60 23.20 101    /    72 
Coal 
(billion short tons) 173.10 0.26 0.32 666    /    541 
 
This worry of thermal fuel shortage brings another problem, the fluctuation of the 
prices. The global market of oil is undergoing huge up-and-downs in recent years. The price 
of natural gas was even manipulated by Russia to use as a political instrument toward some 
former Soviet States. Although now Russia is at a vantage point of operating the global 
energy market; and its domestic use of fossil fuels are not affected by the unsteady outer 
environment, it still needs to create a robust plan for its own energy supply, reducing the 
influence of fuel price to a practical minimum. 
 
                                                        
28
 United Nations Statistics Division. “Environment Glossary, McKelvey Box.” 
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 ibid.. 
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3.1.4 Intelligence Reserve and Technology R&D 
 
Russia has a pool of technical talent in aerospace, nuclear engineering, and basic 
sciences inherited from the Soviet Union. Take nuclear science for example, Russia launched 
the world’s first nuclear reactor. Since then this country has never stopped its efforts on 
research of better reactor, even after the Chernobyl accident. Large human resources have 
been invested into this field of science. Recently, Russia has initiated an innovative nuclear 
power development based on its decades of nuclear technology R&D. The aim of this 
innovation is to shift this industry to a new fast reactor phase by using more out of a same 
amount of fuel. This provides a solid base for alternative R&D of electricity portfolio of 
Russia. 
 
3.1.5 Environment Issues 
 
Global warming is an inevitable issue nowadays for any energy related development. 
A broader influence is the rising of green house gas proportion that would affect earth ground 
surface area and the global climate. A direct influence from energy related activities is the use 
of thermal power plants would greatly harm the local ecology by mining and burning the 
fuels. Russia is the largest country in the world. If take the area as the unit, it has a relatively 
the largest responsibility to the earth environment. 
 
3.1.6 Political Concerns 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the former Soviet States either have 
been or are undergoing the revolution toward Democracy. This brings a problem serious to 
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the Russian government—their former brothers have turned to the other side. One famous 
example is the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. Ukraine controls the main pipe from Russia to the 
Europe, as Russia lost this former brother, the export gas price offered to Ukraine was not a 
unilateral decision anymore. This would definitely affect Russia’s main export business. In 
fact, while Russia was trying to make the best out of its energy resource exports, it also 
created an energy security problem to the Europe. As long as fossil fuels are needed, Europe 
cannot reach its energy independence; but by turning Russia-neighboring former Soviet 
States into their allies, the Europe gained more balance on the leverage. 
 
A fatal flaw of having limited kinds of energy exports is emerging, not to say this 
contributes the major part of exportation. Russia needs to develop the variety on its energy 
products in order to alleviate the political pressure from its image of gas and oil monopoly. 
Nuclear electricity as a product, its technology and services can be an underlying break point 
for Russia to establish its own electricity portfolio. 
 
3.2 Nuclear, Wind, Clean Coal? 
 
Based on the above six aspects, this section will focus on how Russia optimize its 
electricity portfolio according its own interest. 
 
3.2.1 Stakeholders 
 
 A stakeholder analysis 32  will identify people, groups, and institutions that will 
                                                        
32
 Stakeholder analysis is a term used in conflict resolution, project management, and business administration to describe a 
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influence or be influenced by the change of electricity portfolio (either positively or 
negatively); anticipate the kind of influence; and develop strategies to get the most effective 
support possible and reduce any obstacles to successful implementation of new electricity 
portfolio. 
 In this analysis, stakeholders concerning optimizing the Russian electricity portfolio 
are sorted into three groups, community, government sectors, and businesses. Community 
stakeholders are categorized according to different groups of people related to electricity 
industry chain segments; government stakeholders are from local, departmental, to central 
powers; business stakeholders are from different energy companies. See Stakeholders 
Analysis Matrix on the next page. 
 According to the impact index in the Matrix, all stakeholders considered are either 
having overall positive influence or getting overall positive influence. The potential strategies 
that suggested in the Matrix focus on residents getting job opportunities and preferential 
electricity price; government sectors providing financial, political, and juristic supports; 
businesses enhance market exploit, industry self-discipline, and facilities construction. The 
analysis reveals a positive momentum from each side of the stakeholders. 
 
3.2.2 S.W.O.T. on Alternatives 
 
Among all the alternative choices of energy, the following three are alternative choices to 
Russian electricity portfolio. Russia’s alternative portfolio of electricity will not end up on a  
                                                                                                                                                                            
process where all the individuals or groups that are likely to be affected by a proposed action are identified and then sorted 
according to how much they can affect the action and how much the action can affect them. 
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Table 2: Stakeholder Analysis Matrix 
Stakeholder Stakeholder Interest(s) in the Project Assessment 
of Impact* Potential Strategies for Obtaining Support or Reducing Obstacles 
Community 
Residents adjacent 
Power Plants 
May have steady, cheap power supply; 
May migrate due to new construction; 
Health under potential risks; 
Water, soil, and air contamination 
N 
Job opportunities like logistics support, dining, entertainment services 
for plant employees; Government supported immigration plan; special 
residential electricity price offer by company of plants; contamination 
risk and data release on certain time base; state standards on emission 
Residents adjacent the 
Mining Sites 
More labor job opportunity; 
Ecological damage; 
Water, soil and air contamination 
B Job opportunity offering; ecology protective mining; state standards on 
water, soil and air contamination control 
Residents in Cities 
May have steady, cheap power supply; 
May be under risk of nearby plants; 
May have to pay environment tax on 
certain commodity 
C 
Education of environmental problem and alternative energy; upgrade 
city power grids; proper selection on location of new plant sites; 
comprehensive emergency plan by government 
Government Sectors 
Municipal Government Maintain and improve city grid; Integrate more kinds of energy companies B 
Ensure stable fiscal revenue; commercialize city grid with proper 
government support; strengthen regulations for electricity companies 
Rosatom (State Owned 
Nuclear Company) 
More investment on nuclear R&D; 
Public pressure on storage and 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel; 
A 
Allocate more funds for nuclear R&D; Proper selection of spent fuel 
storage sites; open and transparent reprocessing; strengthen regulation 
on management of weapon-grade material 
Ministry of Energy Restructure based on new energy portfolio A Submit state law on management of alternative energy 
Businesses 
Gazprom Investment on environment control; Less percentage on domestic market B 
Exploit and consolidate foreign markets; promote the establishment of 
OPEC-like organization of natural gas 
Oil/Pipeline Companies 
New pipeline to build for more countries; 
New pipeline detouring certain countries; 
Investment on clean extraction 
A 
Implement the construction of new pipelines to Europe, Far East, and 
west Asia; gain more power on the price decision of gas on the global 
market 
Rosenergoatom 
More reactors to build home and overseas; 
Investment on reactor safety technology; 
Large cost on decommision of old plants 
A 
Expand nuclear reactor construction contracts in global market; provide 
fuel reprocessing service; maintain the old plants with stable operation 
performance and apply for extension on operation licenses 
Inter RAO UES 
Upgrade the state power grids; 
Balancing cost and price from different 
electricity sources 
A Adopt SMART grid; full and effective market research on optimizing 
electricity portfolio distribution 
*Assign A for extremely important, B for fairly important, C for not very important, N for overall negative. 
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single choice of one kind of new major electricity source. There would be a timeline to 
develop a mature portfolio. Choices not ready for adopting may be adopted in the future. But 
for current situation and due to the country’s natural restrictions, many kinds of alternative 
choices, such as solar power and biomass, are precluded from the pool of selection for 
latitude and soil reasons (see previous section of 2.1.2). The three most reasonable choices 
are nuclear, wind, and clean-coal, the S.W.O.T. analysis (strengths, weakness, opportunity, 
and threats) will explain each of their arguments respectively. 
 
1) Nuclear Energy 
 
Nuclear technology is designed to extract usable energy from atomic nuclei via 
controlled nuclear reactions. The most common method is through nuclear fission. It has 
already been used as one of the major technologies to generate electricity. Today, more than 
15% of the world's electricity comes from nuclear power, with the U.S., France, and Japan 
together accounting for 56.5% of nuclear generated electricity33. There are 439 nuclear power 
reactors in operation in the world at present34, operating in 31 countries35. Conventional 
nuclear power plants use uranium 235 as its fuel, some use plutonium 239; Russia is planning 
to use innovative technology to switch to a new energy resource – Uranium 238 – by the 
middle of the 21st century, while the fact is that uranium 238 is more abundant than uranium 
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 World Nuclear Association. "World Nuclear Power Reactors and Uranium Requirements." Retrieved on June 9, 2008. 
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235 in Russia and the world.36 This would secure the fuel supply and technology support for 
Russia in nuclear sector. 
 
Strengths: a) Nuclear plants are more efficient than other conventional thermal plants in the 
amount of fuel they use. A typical nuclear reactor produces 3 cubic meters (25–
30 tons) of spent fuel each year37. Less fuel means less transportation of fuel, 
which contributes a reduction on transportation green house gas emission. 
b) Nuclear plants have no actual burning process like conventional thermal plants 
do. This part greatly reduces the green house gas emissions, and most 
importantly, no air pollutant. 
c) The uranium fuel used for nuclear plants has no other application until today. 
Based on the limited market of 439 operating commercial reactors and many 
other small reactors for research or military use, the market price of uranium is 
relatively stable and it is not affected by political and world economic situations. 
d) Overall, nuclear electricity has the lowest generation cost per kWh, a price of 
$0.025 per kWh38, compared to $0.029 per kWh of a coal-fired plant39. 
Weakness: a) Nuclear plants’ most disputed weakness is its spent nuclear fuel, which is still 
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highly radioactive. Current management of nuclear waste concentrates on two 
major methods—storage and reprocessing. Storage has a potential future 
contaminant problem while reprocessing has a potential risk of proliferation. 
b) Nuclear plants have a relatively large initial investment on its construction. For 
a nuclear plant this may be higher than for other energy forms because the 
buildings used for containment or for safety-related equipment must meet 
higher standards than the traditional structures. This will put the company who 
runs the nuclear plant under larger financial risk. 
c) Building nuclear plants faces a pressure coming from public opinion. The fact 
of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents cannot be ignored and have 
long been clouded over the public attention on nuclear civil application. 
Opportunity: An innovative technology of nuclear plant is being initiated in Russia. This 
program solves two major issues. One is to secure the fuel supply by using its 
isotope of 238 instead of uranium 235. Uranium 238 is 10 times higher in 
resource compared to coal and 25 times higher compared to natural gas40. The 
other opportunity is to alleviate the radiation of waste fuel to the minimum by 
adopting closed fuel cycle technology, eliminating most of the short half life 
element, and reuse other effective fuel again in breeder reactors. If this program 
is achieved, the largest barriers of further civil application of nuclear energy are 
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leveled down to the ground. 
Threats: The major threat to the nuclear industry is coming from its decommissioning. 
Decommissioning involves many administrative and technical actions. It 
includes all clean-up of radioactivity and progressive demolition of the plant. 
This is not only a time consuming process that requires years of plant cooling 
down, but also highly in cost. For example, in USA many utilities estimates now 
average $325 million per reactor all-up (1998 $)41. 
 
2) Wind Energy 
 
By using wind turbines, wind energy is converted into electricity. Although wind 
produces only about 1%42 of world-wide electricity use, it is growing rapidly, increasing 
more than fivefold globally between 2000 and 200743. Wind energy as a power source is 
favored by many environmentalists as an alternative to fossil fuels, as it is plentiful, 
renewable, widely distributed, clean, and produces lower greenhouse gas emissions, although 
the construction of wind farms is not universally welcomed due to their visual impact and 
other effects on the environment. 
 
Strengths: a) Wind power has a flexible dispatch function. It can be connected to the main 
grid, and can also provide electricity to isolated locations. This makes it a first-
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rank supplementary alternative. 
b) Wind energy is free energy eventually from solar energy, which means no fuel 
cost on its operation. This advantage is not comparable by nuclear and thermal 
plants. 
Weakness: a) The intermittency of wind seldom creates problems when using wind power to 
supply a low proportion of total demand. Where wind is to be used for a 
moderate fraction of demand, additional costs for compensation of intermittency 
are considered to be modest. Recent studies have attempted to determine the 
actual cost of intermittency, and they indicated it is currently in the area of 2-5 
tenths of a cent per kWh44. 
b) Since wind speed is not constant, a wind farm's annual energy production is 
never as much as the sum of the generator nameplate ratings multiplied by the 
total hours in a year. Wind turbines have relatively low capacity factors, typical 
range from 20% to 40%45, compared to 70%-80% of coal plants and about 90% 
of nuclear plants46. 
c) Wind farms take a large area of land to build. Footprint of power plants seems 
not to be a problem for Russia, but will be critical to small territory countries. 
Opportunity: Off-shore wind farm is the major and most effective way of using wind energy. 
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Off-shore locations may offset their higher construction cost with higher annual 
load factors, thereby reducing cost of energy produced. And it does not occupy 
land territory. 
Threats: Unfortunately most of the wind potential is located in sparsely inhabitant territories, 
where the population density is less then 1 person per square kilometer. This 
means that there are not industrial energy consumers, to develop enough 
electrical grid and electrical generating equipment, which could compensate 
unstable wind nature. And it also has a problem of high cost on long distance 
transmission power lines. 
 
3) Clean Coal-fired Plants 
 
Coal is a vital fuel in most parts of the world. Current running Russian coal-fired 
power plants are high in particulate pollution due to its old age and low technology in flue 
gas cleaning. Over 25% of coal-fired power plants in Russia have an ash content of above 
40%47 . This does not only requires a more practical combination of different kinds of 
environmental-friendly electricity sources, but also a more advanced clean coal technology, 
which is under discussion of implementation. The most promising “clean coal” technology 
involves using the coal to make hydrogen from water, then burying the resultant carbon 
dioxide by-product and burning the hydrogen48. The greatest challenge is bringing the cost of 
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this down sufficiently for "clean coal" to compete with nuclear power on the basis of near-
zero emissions for base-load power. 
 
Strengths: Clean coal technology consists of three major parts as pre-burn cleaning of coal, 
clean burn process (gasification processes), and post-burn cleaning of emissions. 
This technology has the potential to provide what may be called “zero 
emissions” - in reality, extremely low emissions of the conventional coal 
pollutants, and as low-as-engineered carbon dioxide emissions. 
Weakness: The three steps make the clean coal technology fairly complicated process. It is 
even not using the same theory as a conventional coal-fired plant. This could 
accompany very high cost of its construction. 
Opportunity: Though with high cost of construction, a practicable plant can be built based 
on a re-modification of an existing coal-fired plant. Scientists hope that by the 
year of 2012, a commercial designed plant with an electricity cost of only 10% 
greater than conventional coal plant will be available49. 
Threats: Projections say that at the current production rate, coal reserve would last 164 
years50. When coal price goes up in the future, the cost of electricity production 
from any kind of coal plants will rise drastically. And this will increase the 
financial threshold of operating such a high-tech plant. 
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3.2.3 Comparison Measurement Criteria 
 
 There are 4 major criteria for summarizing the S.W.O.T. analysis and creating plant 
integrated value matrix. The four criteria are cost, benefit, equity, and robustness. 
The cost criterion consists of implementation cost and negative externality cost. The 
cost of the implementation is expressed in electricity cost per kilowatt-hour. The calculation 
of the figures is briefly concluded in Table 3 with specific item costs for plants of similar age 
and size with a unit of dollars per Megawatt-hour ($10 / MWh = 1 cent / kWh). 
But when creating the matrix (Table 4), the implementation cost, which is indexed by 
electricity price per kilowatt-hour, is substituted by the fuel cost. This is because a wind 
turbine power plant’s capacity is usually not comparable to a nuclear or a coal-fired one. 
When considering this factor, other subsections of implementation cost have relatively small 
influences compare to fuel cost. 
Table 3 shows what the implementation cost is composed of. Followed is a 
description of how the fuel cost is calculated. 
 
Table 3: Implementation Costs of Three Types of Plant 
Item Cost Element Nuclear Commercial Wind (City) 
Residential 
Wind (Rural) 
Clean 
Coal 
1 Fuel 4.0 0 0 12.0 
2 Operation & Maintenance 5.0 2.0 2.0 5.0 
3 Pensions, Insurances, Taxes 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
4 Regulatory Fees 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
5 Property Tax 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
6 Capital 7.0 6.0 2.0 10.0 
7 Waste Cost 4.0 0 0 1.0 
8 Administrative / overheads 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Total  25.0 40.0* 100.0* 32.1 
*Total numbers of wind power are scaled up to match the same capacity size of other two kinds of plants. 
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The fuel cost is calculated as follow: 
A 1,000 Megawatt-hour nuclear plant consumes an average of 30 tons of uranium. 
The cost of uranium is about $100 per pound. That equals to a rough price of $200,000 per 
ton of uranium. Therefore, the annual cost of fuel of a 1,000 Megawatt-hour nuclear plant 
will be around $6,000,000. 
On the other hand, the average market price for coal is $100 per ton. A 1,000 
Megawatt-hour coal-fired plant will consume 200,000 tons of coal, which makes the fuel cost 
around $20,000,000. 
Considering the pretreatment, protection measurements, transportation, and other fees 
of uranium are higher than coal, the fuel cost ratio is around 1:3 between nuclear and coal-
fired plants. 
 
Negative externality consists of three parts: emission, public concern, and waste. 
Basically these three alternatives can all be considered as “zero-emission” plants. But with a 
lowest thermal efficiency, nuclear power plants have large thermal emissions. On the other 
hand, clean coal plants usually run under a cogeneration mode with heat product to the local 
community. Public concern is a bigger problem for nuclear plants for its security issues; for 
wind plants, killing of migrating birds has been a voice of complain from the beginning; 
Waste problem of nuclear plants raises large costs on its treatment while the other plants 
almost have no waste products. 
Positive externality also consists of three elements, political, scientific, and economic 
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benefits. Nuclear plants may raise the country’s statue by technology level and military 
threats. Using of clean coal technology is a substantial political capital to show its endeavor 
on global warming. Nuclear plants have a unique scientific benefit. The reactors produce 
various kinds of isotopes in the fuel cycle. Many of those isotopes are indispensable to 
medical treatment, especially on tumors. In respect of economic benefits, nuclear plants can 
be exported as a whole unit or as services. Russia is also ambitious on regulating the 
international market of spent fuel reprocessing. 
Other important criteria include equity and robustness. All three kinds of electricity 
industries seem fairly independent to others. Nuclear power industry has even been 
completely taken over by a state company of Russian government, Rosatom. Wind power 
serves efficiently as supplementary electricity supply, as it can satisfy area that cost high for 
large-scale grids. Only the coal-fired plants occupy major part of electricity industry may 
have negative equity for others. Nuclear power holds a neutral robustness because the future 
problem of decommissioning cancels out the solidity of this technology; Wind power’s 
negative robustness is coming from its unstable capacity due to intermittency of wind energy; 
Coal-fired plants will continue to dominate Russia’s electricity industry due to its stability, 
solid facility foundation, and coal reserves. 
A summary of all these criteria is presented in Table 4 with integrated value scale 
ranges from -15 to 15 at 0.5 unit of interval. 
In the Matrix, nuclear has a highest score among the three. This result singled out 
nuclear power plant as the most suitable choice for Russia to adopt as the new major 
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electricity source to sustain the country’s energy-economy structure. 
 
Table 4: Criteria Matrix of Three Types of Technology 
 Nuclear Wind Clean Coal 
Cost 
Implementation $0.025 / kWh City $0.04 / kWh $0.032 / kWh Rural $0.1 / kWh 
Fuel -4 0 -12 
Negative 
Externality 
Emission 0 0 -0.5 
Public 
concern 
-2 -1 -1 
Waste -3 0 0 
Benefit 
Positive 
Externality 
Political 2 0 3 
Scientific 2 0 0 
Economic 4 1 2 
Other 
Equity 0 0.5 -0.5 
Robustness 2 -0.5 0.5 
Total 1 0 -9.5 
 
 Based on the country’s particular advantages, a proper proportion of nuclear, clean 
coal, and wind power can be added to the existing scenario—roughly 63% from thermal 
plants, 21% by hydropower and 16% comes from nuclear reactors51 . Combine Russia’s 
blueprint of nuclear power development, a percentage of 25% is set to be achieved before the 
year of 2030. On the other hand, burning coal without adding to global carbon dioxide levels 
is a major technological challenge which is being addressed. Thermal power plants will still 
be in dominant role due to its cost and adaptability for Russia. 
Therefore, considering the capacity growth factor, the percentage of coal-fired plants 
will drop slightly in percentage, but with large actual increase in capacity. This is because of 
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the rocketing electricity demand coming from every sector of domestic development. Wind 
power may take at most 1% in total according to its zero current status. Nuclear power will 
reach a higher percentage not only in Putin’s nuclear blueprint, but also in an actual fast way. 
The following chapter will discuss the proper role of nuclear power in the country’s energy 
future. 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
ECONOMY—NUCLEAR 
 
The Introduction and Chapter 2 have addressed that there is a potential lack of 
sustainability of current energy-economy structure in Russia. Chapter 3 has singled out 
nuclear energy from the comparison among major forms of electricity energy supply for 
Russia. Then this chapter will develop the discussion of the proper role of nuclear energy in 
Russia in the future. 
 
4.1 Russian Electricity Output Prediction 
 
For determination of a proper role of nuclear power in the whole picture, a prediction 
of the country’s electricity output is essential. There are myriad factors that affect the annual 
electricity output for a country, the climate situation, the population and its distribution, the 
industrial demands, the natural resource portfolio, the energy policies, and the economy, etc. 
For Russia, several of the major factors are as follows. As being the largest country in 
territory in the world and located near the Antarctic Ocean, it has a longer winter duration 
and colder climate than most of the other countries. This will produce a large demand in 
heating supply, which is also correlated to the population. Though Russia has a population of 
145 million52, which is small consider its large territory, the population distribution is highly 
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skewed to the European part of Russia, with a wide spread distribution of small population in 
the Ural, Siberia, and Far East regions53. This will require intensive, steady, sufficient energy 
supply in highly populated urban areas in the European part; and flexible, economical energy 
supply in extremely low density areas in the Asian part. But the factor of industrial demands 
creates a relatively balanced or even greater demand from the low density regions in the 
Asian part of Russia, since most of the country’s heavy industry are scattered away from the 
major cities. Russia has large amount of fossil fuel reserves that can be used to generate 
electricity, while at the same time, the country’s energy policy suggests that the government 
is counting on the earnings from exporting those resources. All together, they produce a 
comprehensive drive for a large electricity demand while fossil fuels were dragged away to 
export. This is the point where we see the chance of the booming of nuclear electricity in 
Russia. 
Based on these listed, but not all, factors, the electricity output is hard to predict since 
every factor has its own model of development. Thus, a mediator is needed here to 
summarize the overall trend of all these factors and better to be highly correlated to the 
electricity output. In this way, a macro point of view would better inspect this problem. 
As we know, the general gross production (GDP) is a commonly used indicator of the general 
condition of a country’s economy. The energy projections are highly sensitive to underlying 
assumptions about GDP growth—the primary driver of energy demand. Energy demand has 
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tended to rise broadly in line with GDP growth in the past three decades or so.54 And on the 
other hand, the electricity generation supports the residential and industrial needs of energy, 
which all contribute to the accumulation of GDP. This proposed relation will be tested in the 
following part of this chapter. 
 
 
 
First of all, the actual data on annual electricity output and the GDP net value of 
Russia from 1991 through 2007 is plotted in Figure 255. The two lines representing real GDP 
and electricity output are both in an approximate V shape. Both the electricity output and the 
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 International Energy Agency. Key Assumptions and Macroeconomic Factors of Chapter 1, World Energy Outlook 2006. 
OECD/IEA, 2007. 53, 57. 
 
55
 Russian GDP data is retrieved from World Bank; and Russian electricity output is retrieved from the EIA, outputs of 1991 
and 2006 are not available from the data source. 
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GDP dropped considerably through the Yeltsin administration, which is from 1991 to 1999.  
And they both went up from the year of 2000, when Putin took over the power. This rise 
continued through 2007 (after a decade of high growth averaging 7% during 1999-2007, 
Russian economy still gained a solid growth in 2008 of 5.6%56, but the electricity output of 
2008 is not available at the moment of writing this thesis). The same trend indicates that there 
might be a strong correlation between the two. 
 Notice that the electricity output and GDP are changing in the opposite directions 
during three short periods (1994-1995, 1996-1997, and 1998-1999), which were shown in 
Figure 2. This suggests a possibility that the relationship between the two variables may not 
be linear. To test this possibility, a quadratic regression is developed where GDP is the 
independent variable and the electricity output is the dependent variable. The result of the 
quadratic regression is shown as the curve in Figure 3 and the quadratic regression equation 
is below: 
 Electricity Output = 741.83 + 0.29*GDP - 0.000064*GDP^2. 
The F-test value on this quadratic regression model is 9.88 and its p value is 0.0029 (p<.05). 
This p value suggests the quadratic regression model a significant one. But the curve is close 
to a straight line which suggests that the relation between the two variables may be closer to 
linear than quadratic. This indication can be proved by the coefficient of the quadratic GDP 
in the quadratic regression equation. The coefficient of GDP square is -0.000064, its p value 
is 0.6559, which is not statistically significant (p>=.05). This insignificant p value on the 
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quadratic GDP coefficient plus the significant p value of the f-test on the whole model 
indicate that the quadratic variable does not help on explaining the relationship and it is 
mostly explained by the intercept and the GDP coefficient. Therefore, the possibility of the 
relationship between the two variables to be quadratic is proved excessive. 
 
 
 
To properly inspect the relationship, the two sets of data were put into a linear 
regression. The aim of the linear regression analysis is to justify the impression from Figure 1 
that they were changing in a similar trend (positive correlation) and find out how close are 
these two variables correlated in a statistical way. 
 
F Value      9.88 
Pr > F     0.0029 
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The result of the linear regression is shown as the solid fit line in Figure 4. The result 
tells that the years from 1999 to 2007 (2006 missing) are scattered around the regression line 
within the 95 percent confidence interval (block area along the fit line). And all the outliers 
are the years from 1991 to 1998 (1991 missing). This result indicates that the correlation 
between the two variables from 1999 to 2007 can be explained by a linear function more 
accurately, which is better for electricity output prediction based on GDP. Furthermore, the 
start point of year 1999 coincides with the turning point of both electricity output growth and 
GDP rebound shown in Figure 1. These results suggest that further analysis could split the 
data into two parts and do regression on both periods respectively, in order to find out a more 
F Value     20.82 
Pr > F     0.0005 
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accurate periodical linear function for electricity output on GDP. 
According to the result from the previous regression, the data set is split into Group A 
from 1991 to 1999 and Group B from 2000 to 2007. Year 1999 is not an outlier in the 
previous regression, but it is moved into Group A of outliers for two reasons. One is because 
it is the turning point as shown in Figure 1, it will not affect the result of either split 
regressions, it can serve as either the end point of Group A or the start point of Group B; 
more importantly, Group A covers the Yeltsin administration and Group B covers the Putin 
administration, the results of the two groups like this will better reveal the effect of policy 
changes during the Putin administration. 
 
 
F Value      3.64 
Pr > F     0.1048 
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The result of Group A regression is shown as the solid fit line in Figure 5. The result 
shows that the years from 1991 to 1999 (1991 missing) are scattered away from the fit line, 
and the 95 percent confidence interval is wide. This result indicates that the correlation 
between electricity output and GDP may not be a statistically significant linear relationship. 
The result of Group B regression is shown as the solid fit line in Figure 6. In this 
regression, similar as shown in Figure 4, years 2000 to 2007 (2006 missing) are closely 
scattered along the regression line, and the 95 percent confidence interval is narrow and close 
to a parallel pattern. This result indicates a good linear relationship for electricity output 
prediction based on GDP. 
 
 
F Value    140.32 
Pr > F     0.0003 
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Table 5 is a summary of basic statistics from the above three linear regressions. The p 
value of the coefficient of Group A (1991-1999) is not statistically significant (p>=.05), 
therefore, statistically this period is not suitable for electricity output prediction. This will be 
supported by the statistics from the Pearson Correlation Tests that follows Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Linear Regressions of Russian Electricity Output on GDP 
 1991-2007 A: 1991-1999 B: 2000-2007 
Intercept 767.76*** 658.75*** 786.33*** 
GDP 0.20*** 0.48 0.17*** 
N 15(a)(b) 8(a) 7(b) 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
(a)
 one observation missing on Electricity Output of 1991 
(b)
 one observation missing on Electricity Output of 2006 
 
The Pearson Correlation Tests are summarized in Table 6. This test gives out direct 
values of the correlation between the two variables. As have indicated from the third linear 
regression of Group B, the data of the period from 2000 to 2007 would better predict the 
electricity output; the Pearson Correlation Tests also show that the two variables are 
extremely correlated during this period. 
 
Table 6: Correlation between Russian Electricity Output and GDP 
 1991-2007 A: 1991-1999 B: 2000-2007 
Correlation 0.79*** 0.61 0.99*** 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
Therefore, the prediction equation is generated from the third linear regression based 
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on data from 2000 to 2007. The equation is:  
 
Electricity Output = 786.33 + 0.17*GDP 
 
Using this equation, we can predict electricity output value with a given projected GDP value. 
Russia's Ministry of Economic Development and Trade drew up in November 2007 a 
forecast for national economic development until 2020. Under the forecast, GDP is expected 
to reach $5 trillion in 2020.57 After putting this GDP value into our prediction function, we 
get that the predicted electricity output of Russia at the year of 2020 will be 1647.30 Billion 
kWh. The result is plotted in Figure 7. 
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 RIA Novosti. “Russia may become world's fifth largest economy by 2020.” December 24, 2007. 
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 The next section in this chapter will discuss the nuclear share out of the projected 
electricity output in the coming future according to several important nuclear related policies. 
 
4.2 Nuclear Share 
 
 To evaluate the role of nuclear power in Russia in the coming future, two indicators 
can be representative, one is the percentage of nuclear electricity, and the other is the 
country’s overall nuclear capacity. Especially the former one, a percentage can be more direct 
in answering the question of how much the country’s electricity is generated by nuclear 
power plants. The goal of the two indicators by 2020 has been set by Rosatom. To cross test 
whether the two indicators are consistent, the total electricity output and the nuclear power 
plant capacity factor will be needed in addition to fulfill the equation of Russia’s nuclear 
electricity output below: 
 
C * H * f = O * P   , 
 
where C is the country’s total nuclear electricity generation capacity (GWe); H is a constant 
of 8760 hours in a year; f is the capacity factor; O is the total electricity output of the year 
(billion kWh); and P is the nuclear electricity percentage. 
 The expressions on the two sides of the above equation represent two different ways 
to calculate Russia’s nuclear electricity output of a designated year. By calculating with 
current true value of C, f, O, and P58, the credibility of the equation is proved. 
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 In order to evaluate the role of nuclear power in Russia by 2020, values of C, f, O of 
2020 are projected. In September 2006 Rosatom announced a target of nuclear providing 
23% of electricity by 2020, thus commissioning two 1200 MWe plants per year from 2011 to 
2014 and then three per year until 2020.59 According to this plan, the value of C would be 
around 52.9 GWe by 2020. However, by April 2009 reduced electricity demand expectations 
due to the recession caused the whole construction program outlined above to be scaled back, 
and some projects put on hold. In July 2009 a revised federal target program (FTP) for 2010-
2015 and until 2020 was approved and signed by the President, 43.3 GWe of nuclear 
electricity is being on line. These two different figures are considered as high and low 
scenarios for Russia’s nuclear capacity by 2020. 
 The capacity factor and the total electricity output of 2020 will be held constant in the 
calculation. Energoatom, a company under Rosatom who owns all civil reactors, aims the 
capacity factor for 90% by 201560. Capacity factor of Russia in 2020 is taking current U.S. 
average nuclear power capacity factor of 92%. And total electricity output is projected by the 
regression in previous section of 4.1, 1647.30 Billion kWh by 2020. 
 By calculation with these numbers, the projected nuclear electricity percentages are 
21.2% and 25.9% for low and high scenarios respectively. The Rosatom projection of 23% 
sits between the two scenarios. This indicates that the projections of 43.3 GWe and 52.9 GWe 
as total nuclear capacity are also reasonable. 
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 A summary of data used for the equation is presented in Table 7. 
 In either scenario, nuclear electricity percentage will exceed 20%, and may surpass a 
quarter in the high scenario, reaching nearly 26%. This would be a large progress from the 
current 15.7% under the circumstance of steady GDP growth until 2007 and early 2008. 
Although Rosatom revised the nuclear plan slightly at the beginning of 2009 due to the world 
financial crisis, recent revision has scaled up the plan again with more conservative 
extending capacity, and this will still push the percentage at least to 21.2%. 
 
Table 7: Projections of Russia’s Nuclear Electricity Share in Low & High Scenarios 
 
C: Total Capacity 
(GWe) 
f: Capacity 
Factor 
O: Total 
Electricity Output 
of the Year 
(billion kWh) 
P: Nuclear 
Electricity 
Percentage 
Current 21.7 79.5% 1016.0 15.7% 
2020 (Low) 43.3 92.0% 1647.3 21.2% 
2020 (High) 52.9 92.0% 1647.3 25.9% 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
NUCLEAR—POLICY 
 
In order to make the numbers projected in Chapter 4 happen, certain policies 
targeting the nuclear energy industry need to be implemented properly. Although during the 
Putin administration, Rosatom announced a target of nuclear energy share in electricity 
production of 23 percent by 2020 and 25 percent by 2030, there are still several important 
factors to be considered, and they will affect the nuclear power percentage in a certain way. 
Beside GDP discussed before, these factors include population growth, new nuclear 
technologies and services, uranium availability, environmental issues, public acceptance, and 
financial readiness. These factors are highly related to nuclear industry development, the 
synergies and tradeoffs among them will have important effects on the development of 
nuclear energy. 
 
5.1 Population 
 
Russian population experienced a continuous decline of about 5 million since it 
peaked shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Currently, population growth is nearly 
stagnant, with an overall population growth of -0.085% in 2008.61 The general population 
curve is shown in Figure 8. 
                                                        
61
 Population estimates as of 1 January 2009, State Statistical Service of the Russian Federation. Retrieved on February 20, 
09. http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b09_00/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/7-0.htm. 
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Figure 8: Population of Russia 1991-2008 
 
Source: Federal State Statistics Service, Russia62 
 
 This decline will continuously exist in a foreseeable future. Every year there are 
fewer and fewer Russians. And the emerging rise in births has not compensated for our 
declining population. 63  An APEC report predicted that by the year of 2020, Russian 
population will drop to 121 million, over a 20 million loss from current population64; and the 
UN warned in 2005 that Russia's then population could fall by a third by 2050 if trends did 
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not improve65. 
 But as have shown in Figure 1 that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither the 
GDP nor the electricity output dropped like the population did. The opposite trends have its 
reasons according to Russia’s special situation. 
 Russia's population is predominantly urban, with 73% of its population of 
141,903,979 citizens residing in urban areas66. The urbanization level is expected to increase 
from 73% to 78%, over the period from 2002 to 203067. This increase could have chance to 
cancel out some of the influence from population decrease, or even over take it. As standard 
of living improves across the economy recovery, urban electricity consumption from 
residential and commercial sectors will rise dramatically. 
 Other than this, Russia’s industrial electricity consumption takes the major part of the 
whole usage. With the Soviet industrial legacy, especially Russia’s heavy industry will be a 
major propeller for its economic development. This part could also balance out the influence 
of population drop somehow. 
 But this is not to say that population growth policy is not important for Russia’s 
electricity generation increase. The high urban population rate and heavy industry 
consumption have over taken the negative influence of population decline, this is proved by 
the increasing electricity output for the past decade. With a series of hortative policies, 
population may not go down that bad as predicted. The lesser the population declines, the 
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more it can contribute to the residential electricity consumption. 
 
5.2 Nuclear Technologies and Services 
 
Russia currently has an installed nuclear capacity of 21.2 megawatts, distributed 
across 31 operational nuclear reactors at 10 locations68. In October 2006, the government of 
Russia approved the Federal Program for development of the nuclear industry until the year 
2015. The program includes reorganization of the industry and state owned facilities. Under 
this program, it is expected that 10 GW of nuclear electricity generation capacity will be 
commissioned by the year 2015, and the construction of another 10 reactors will be started. 
Rosatom's long-term strategy is 23% by 2020, 25% by 2030, and up to 2050 involves moving 
to inherently safe nuclear plants using fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle and MOX fuel. 
Starting from 2020-25 fast neutron reactors will play an increasing role in Russia, and under 
optimistic scenario nuclear capacity by 2050 has expansion plans to 90 GW.69 
One of the major barriers that inhibited the development of civil usage of nuclear 
energy comes from the spent nuclear fuels (SNF). More specifically speaking, the open fuel 
cycle is leaving untreated SNF to store in the repository. The problems concerning SNF can 
be categorized into two major aspects: its radioactive chemical nature and its undecided 
future treatment and usage. 
From a technical point of view, to dodge the problems brought by the open fuel cycle, 
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SNF should be reprocessed in a closed cycle. This is a technology that will reuse the 
remaining energy in the SNF and leave out materials only with low level of radiation and 
short half life to storage. Theoretically, this will minimize the environmental threats from the 
SNF, but there are a lot of realistic issues to think about. 
These issues raise policy concerns when introducing closed cycle and implementing 
reprocessing. Environmental positive externalities of reprocessing are finite and they will not 
be the major reason for a government to choose reprocessing. The policy concerns will focus 
on the cost-effectiveness of reprocessing versus open fuel cycle with SNF storage and the 
potential risk of proliferation during reprocessing. 
Russia has long history of nuclear technology research and development. Even 
suffered from the world’s most severe nuclear accident so far, the country has never stopped 
its steps on construction of nuclear power plants. 
In the new century, Russia has made an important change in its nuclear sector. The 
government reorganized the former Ministry for Atomic Energy into Federal Agency on 
Atomic Energy in 2004 and then reformed it into a state-owned corporation, Rosatom, in 
200770. The purpose of this change is to put the nuclear sector into a market environment, 
and to avoid potential lags brought by the command and control supervision. This may open 
the possibility of cooperation with foreign nuclear companies and governments. 
The currently most important cooperation initiated by state-owned corporation 
Rosatom is the Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure (GNPI) capable of providing secured 
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and non-discriminatory (equal) access to the benefits of nuclear energy to all interested 
countries in strict compliance with non-proliferation requirements. This initiative is aimed 
primarily at countries that are developing nuclear power but not planning to establish 
indigenous uranium enrichment and SNF reprocessing capabilities. As a first step, Russia 
volunteered to initiate a joint project to establish an International Uranium Enrichment 
Center (IUEC) on the basis of its enrichment plant in the city of Angarsk (Irkutsk region). 
This whole project is situated under the IAEA’s Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs).71 
Russia’s idea of this project grew out of its 2005 (Nov.) proposal that Iran share 
ownership of a uranium-enrichment plant located in Russia72.  This proposal did not go 
through and Russia then on 25 January, 2006 committed to the establishment of IUEC in 
Angarsk. The IUEC has three prime objectives:73 
 
1) Promote a wider use of nuclear energy worldwide, and, first of all, in emerging 
nuclear energy countries,  
2) Reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation by discouraging foreign IUEC member 
states from developing indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, uranium 
enrichment in particular,  
3) Provide additional assurances of nuclear fuel supply to the IUEC member states, 
which may voluntarily choose to rely on international routes of nuclear fuel 
supply. 
 
This is a policy innovation with a magnitude of worldwide collaboration. It will 
involve not only the world’s four leading uranium enrichment services suppliers, AREVA 
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(France), TENEX (Russia), URENCO (Germany, the Netherlands and UK), and USEC (US), 
but also many countries as emerging nuclear power users. 
Initiatives on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle are not new. Early back 
in 1946, the Baruch Plan had proposed an International Atomic Development Authority. And 
the establishment of IAEA was also an important step toward this direction. The merit of this 
policy innovation is that it is a multinational approach to try to restructure the market of 
uranium and SNF treatment and provision. It is proposed under the consensus of major 
uranium users and greatly promoted by the government of its practitioner, Rosatom. Russia is 
the only country now has the sufficient technology, intelligence, law, and willingness to 
allow this multilateral nuclear approach to be taken on its territory. With some concerns from 
the international society and actual administrative requirement, IAEA will take its role to 
monitor the project. But still, close scrutiny should be considered in evaluating the policy 
robustness. 
The development of the IUEC will be in three phases: 
 
1) Use part of the existing capacity at Angarsk in cooperation with Kazatomprom 
and under IAEA supervision, 
2) Expand capacity (perhaps double) with funding from new partners, 
3) Full internationalization with involvement of many customer nations under IAEA 
auspices. 
 
The most substantial phase among the three is the second one. Insufficient funding is the 
current fact for Rosatom and the Russian government. As have mentioned in previous section 
of 4.2, a reduced nuclear power plants construction plan of commissioning from 52.9 GWe 
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down to 43.3 GWe was approved in July 2009 due to the recent worldwide recession. The 
synergy of multinational approach on reprocessing and uranium enrichment with sufficient 
funding support could be vital to the effect of implementation of these innovative policies. 
Sufficient funding would enhance the capacity of the conversion plants and bring along 
service demands from customer nations. As a result, increasing income from Russia’s 
services on the multinational approach would provide more funds for domestic nuclear power 
developments. 
 
5.3 Uranium Availability 
 
Uranium supply consists of two consecutive parts, one is uranium mining, and the 
other is uranium enriching. 
The availability and mining of uranium are prevalent concerns. The World Nuclear 
Association said in the document of nuclear power in Russia that the uranium supply is 
expected to suffice for at least 80 years, or more if recycling is increased. However, estimates 
of available uranium ore vary, the Uranium Information Centre in Melbourne, Australia 
estimates the known uranium ore will sustain the once through fuel cycle for another 50 
years at current price levels. It is worth noting that, however, as uranium becomes scarcer and 
prices rise, the need for more resources will greatly increase mining research and the amount 
of known uranium.74 For Russia, there is a substantial economic resources of uranium, with 
about 10% of world reasonably assured resources plus inferred resources up to 130/kg U.S. 
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dollars—546,000 tons of uranium.75 The World Nuclear Association’s summary of Russia’s 
current uranium industry points out that in 2007 Russia produced 3413 tons of uranium from 
mines but this needs to increase substantially to match increased domestic demand.  Estimate 
for 2008 is 3880 tons.  In 2006 there were three mining projects, in 2008 there are three more 
under construction and a further three projected. 
Uranium enriching in Russia is carried out by uranium enrichment centers and serve 
as a secondary fuel supply source. By extracting more energy from the spent uranium using 
reprocessing, less uranium will have to be mined. Some 2500 tons of uranium have so far 
been recycled into RBMK reactors in Russia. They came from reprocessing used fuel from 
VVER-440, fast neutron and submarine reactors.76 
As stated in section 5.2, the policy instrument of building more of uranium 
enrichment centers mainly aimed at international uranium service cooperation, and thus 
affects political and economic strategy of worldwide nuclear fuel security and supply. 
 
5.4 Environmental Issues 
 
Clean and efficient energy supply is not only a responsibility of technology 
development, but is also an agenda relates to economic and political considerations. From a 
policy point of view, how to regulate and guide the development of nuclear power under the 
global trend of green house gas (GHG) emission remission is a big concern. 
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For country like Russia, strict cap on GHG emission is not practical at the moment. 
Andrei Illarionov, Putin’s top advisor, said in St. Petersburg in April 2004 that the restraints 
put on carbon dioxide emissions by the Kyoto Protocol would stifle the Russian economy 
like "an international gulag or Auschwitz."77  The country is still under recovery of economy 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial crisis in 1998, not to mention the one 
just happened in 2008. Great economic incentives are required under the circumstance of its 
relatively low GDP net value and lack of variation in investment sources. Therefore, a 
potential economy revive could be undermined by the implantation of strict emission caps for 
the fact that fast growers are often heavy polluters. In the electricity generation realm, 
conventional fossil fuel power plants are heavy polluters and give out large amount of GHG 
during operation. 
 But the fact is that Putin has signed the Kyoto Protocol during his administration. 
Besides the immediate benefits of visa-free travel offered by the EU within the 25-country 
bloc and EU’s support for Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization78, Russia 
has its own realistic concerns about the leverage on emission remission. 
 Two major long-term considerations can be identified. First is that Russia could be an 
immediate victim of global warming of losing territory for sea level rising along its long 
Antarctic coast line. That would result in losing part of its land mined natural resources in the 
northern part, and under water extraction would be more costly. The second one is that the 
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ratification of Kyoto Protocol can serve as one of the policy drivers for the development of 
nuclear energy. Nuclear power plant has the lowest GHG emission among all kinds of power 
plants, though there were arguments for hydro plant being the lowest in emission. A life cycle 
analysis centered around the Swedish Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant estimated carbon 
dioxide emissions at 3.10 g/kWh, where other data source show hydro plant is estimated 11 
g/kWh, and 950 g for installed coal, 600 g for natural gas generation in the United States in 
1999. This low GHG emission fact gives nuclear power plants a huge advantage in 
environmental protection than other kinds of power plants. This may earn nuclear power 
some votes for its future development. 
 Another nuclear environmental issue concerns about the SNF storage and 
reprocessing. 
As have discussed in section 5.2, environmental positive externalities of reprocessing 
are finite and they will not be the major reason for a government to choose reprocessing. The 
positive externality is that Russia is using its advanced technology and accumulated 
experiences to process and reprocess nuclear fuels for the international market, in this way, 
greatly reduced the risk of radioactive leakage to the environment if operating respectively in 
each country, especially in emerging nuclear energy countries with different levels of nuclear 
technologies. This has two dimensions of reducing the risk. One is that geographically it 
shrinks scattered locations to one; and the other is that all countries using nuclear fuels, 
regardless of their technology level, get the same high level of risk-treatment. 
Uranium reprocessing requires high level technology that is called PUREX, which 
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stands for plutonium/uranium extraction. This is the current commercial reprocessing 
technology. The technology will be used in the IUCE for reprocessing is a more advanced 
technology called UREX+ with transmutation. The UREX+ technology with accelerated 
transmutation of waste (ATW) improves on the conventional PUREX technology by mixing 
the plutonium with minor actinides, making the process more proliferation-resistant. 
Advanced fuel cycles could decrease the time it takes for SNF to return to natural uranium 
radiation levels from 100,000 years down to less than 1,000 years.79 This means the dosage 
of radiation from the treated SNF is much lower than from an open fuel cycle. Dosage 
reductions through transmutation could also help the approval process for repositories and 
eliminate some of the long term uncertainty of the waste storage. 
Another important positive externality is that with reprocessing, current storage 
repositories can be utilized more efficiently and it will greatly reduce the need to build more 
of these expensive repositories. The small percentage of fission products account for most of 
the heat load in SNF, so separating the less radioactive uranium, plutonium, and other short 
lived isotopes would require only a small amount of waste (the fission products) to be 
transported and stored at the repository. In current PUREX practice without transmutation, 
France reduces its spent volume by a factor of four. Advanced fuel cycles with transmutation 
would further increase volumetric savings since the small amount of fission products 
contributing to most of the heat load can be transmuted into more stable products. With 
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transmutation, the storage capacity could increase by a factor as large as 100.80 
Fewer repositories could save time and money for licensing, siting, constructing, and 
transporting spent fuel to the repositories. While some argue that transportation to the 
reprocessing plants is similar to that of transportation to a repository, the plants (reactors, 
reprocessing, and transmutation) can be co-located in energy “parks,” which would decrease 
both transportation and environmental risks. But the Russian idea of world uranium service 
will require international, long distance transportation of fresh fuels and SNF. This will 
increase the chance of leakage to a third party besides Russia and the client country when 
passing their territory even by air. And the transportation will contribute carbon emissions to 
the low record of nuclear industry. 
But the negative environmental externalities brought by SNF storage are yet to 
determine and definitely have great risks. Since the environmental risks of SNF storage will 
automatically be resolved to a standard we can control once reprocessing is widely applied, 
policy concerning storage in the process of nuclear power development is still not clear in 
Russia. The negative externalities of reprocessing would also be derived from this high 
collectiveness of the service. Since Russia will be treating nuclear fuels for multiple country 
clients, the inevitable contaminant to local environment and ecosystem is bound to rise in 
volume and probability. Angarsk is located near the world’s deepest and Asia’s largest fresh 
water lake, the Baikal. The potential negative environment influence will be profound. 
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In addition to GHG, uranium storage and reprocessing issues, there are also the direct 
environmental impacts of uranium mining in terms of tailings waste, production and mining 
processes and their impact on the local environment. Current technology and method of 
uranium mining is using massive amount of water per day, about 15 million liters in a typical 
mine. This will severely damage the local hydrology. Tailings from uranium mining contain 
80% of the level of radioactivity of the original ore as a result of the presence of uranium 
decay products such as Thorium 230, Thorium 234 and Radium 226. 81  Therefore, 
reprocessing reduces the uranium mining and eventually will have positive externalities on 
the environment. 
 
5.5 Public Acceptance 
 
The question of public acceptance will always be raised when considering the nuclear 
choice. The radiation of the fuel can bring catastrophic outcome throughout the whole cycle 
when a plant is out of control at any point. This gives people fear rather than reluctance, 
especially when they have seen the dire consequence of the actual nuclear accident in 
Chernobyl. This fear will grow larger if they weren’t satisfied with enough further 
information feeds from the authorities. And this transparency is actually what tests the 
government’s endeavor on the public acceptance issue of nuclear power. 
The accident of nuclear power plant reactor unit meltdown at Chernobyl is a heavy 
mark on the civil nuclear history. However, this was not the first large-scale radioactive 
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release in the Soviet Union. An earlier accident that contaminated a large area in the southern 
Ural Mountains was covered up by the Soviet government. An explosion in a tank containing 
radioactive waste occurred near Kyshtym, USSR in September 1957. Direct casualties were 
estimated in the hundreds and more than 10,000 people were evacuated from surrounding 
villages. The contaminated region remains closed today. 
Despite significant growth of nuclear capacity within the Soviet nuclear industry later 
in the 1970s, an effective safety culture was considerably undermined. There is a clear 
indication from this cover up made by the Soviet government, they needed a safe nuclear 
developing “fact” to legislate for their state command and control policy on nuclear 
development; and at the same time, to block the information circulation away from the 
outside world. In retrospect, it seems to have been almost inevitable that some accident 
would occur—events at Chernobyl in 1986 merely served to confirm this. This accident 
alerted Western nuclear experts, as well as the public worldwide, to the risks taken in the 
Soviet industry. While, in practical terms, Soviet and East European nuclear development 
slowed considerably, it was not until the collapse of communism that the official standpoint 
on nuclear power changed and Western operators gained the opportunity to co-operate in 
safety work. However, the associated political upheaval and economic depression introduce 
deeper concerns about transparency versus public acceptance. 
Since Russia now is reviving its nuclear industry after over 30 years of Chernobyl, 
the government has to face the public acceptance problem under the new circumstance of 
democratic social structure. This public acceptance would consist of two parts, one is on the 
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safety of nuclear power plants, which focuses on the operation; the other is on the 
transparency of administration. There were lessons the Russians can learn from the 
Chernobyl accident to improve and enhance the public acceptance. 
The Chernobyl accident occurred at a subtle moment that Gorbachev had just 
launched his glasnost policy not for long. And glasnost was compromised by the accident 
when consider the handling of the post-accident issues by the Soviet government. According 
to Gibbs82, he sees the accident the first serious test for glasnost in the mass media. The 
accident was reported on, but, from a hard-news perspective, its handling was a failure. The 
fact is that the Soviet media were quiet on the accident. We have reason to speculate that they 
were forced to remain silence first because when glasnost was implemented, they were urged 
to have candor about administrative shortcomings. A second reason is that the break of the 
silence was demanded by external world after the nuclear technicians of a Swedish plant in 
Forsmark, located two thousand kilometers away, detected high levels of radiation not 
coming from their own plant, but carried by northern winds83. The contrary action of silent 
against glasnost at the beginning and the reluctance in reporting the accident after the fact 
was exposed highly indicate a direct force coming from outside the media sphere to limit the 
mass media to act in the traditional Soviet way. 
True evidence can be found in Gorbachev’s memoirs and Ryzhkov’s Perestroyka. 
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Gorbachev said that the accident “severely affected our reforms by literally knocking the 
country off its tracks.” But at the same time, he pleads ignorance of just how bad the situation 
was84. He also accounted that one opinion in the Soviet Politicheskoye Buro (Politburo) “was 
that information should be given out gradually so as not to cause a panic and even greater 
harm” 85 . On the other hand, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov said the Soviet leadership was 
informed of the extent and scope of the disaster after its occurrence. And members of the 
Politburo were told of the probable consequence from the accident. The members held a 
discussion two days after the accident, prior to the establishment of an emergency 
commission. A main topic of the discussion was about how much information should be 
released. A majority was against the idea of releasing any, but the idea to release some was 
strongly opposed also. The final decision was that only TASS would issue reports86. 
Whatever the case was, TASS issued first brief report around 65 hours (two and half 
days) after the accident, said only that an accident had occurred at the reactor with no further 
comments. In addition to this, TASS released another report within forty minutes about a 
nuclear accident in the United States87. Though this was an often used political tactic, it 
implicated the struggling within the Politburo. The media was itchy to experience some real 
change under glasnost, and Gorbachev was also ambitious about his serious political 
innovation in his second year as general secretary. But as mentioned above, Gorbachev said 
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himself that this unexpected severe accident became a crucial test not only to glasnost, but 
also the efficiency and real ability of the Soviet government. As stated before, inside the 
Politburo there were two totally different ideas on how much information to release. One was 
even addressing not to release any. Glasnost seemed to have no affect on procedure among 
high hierarchy in the Buro, especially in severe situation like this accident which needs 
extreme prudence when taking care of information release strategy. The battle between the 
soft implementation of glasnost and the hard fact that no concrete law or regulation that 
existed to guarantee necessary information release and to guide a timeline of continuous 
information feed to the stakeholders had showed the Soviet government’s preference on non-
transparency. 
Further manipulation on the media was followed. A counterpropaganda campaign 
soon got under way, intended to diminish the impact of the accident.  A Radio Moscow 
commentary paraphrased a long-standing Soviet propaganda line: Nuclear reactors presented 
some dangers, but these paled in comparison with the dangers presented by the Reagan-era 
nuclear buildup in the West. TASS released a letter from Gorbachev to six world leaders 
“criticizing continued American nuclear testing.”88 But Gorbachev, who only recently had 
elaborated upon the merits of glasnost, stayed largely silent on the matter for more than two 
weeks. Only a handful of sources, all highly placed and centralized (Pravda, TASS, Izvestiya, 
and central television) reported the story; TASS reports were used by all lower-level organs89.  
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When the accident was not able to be wrapped from the outside world, domestic 
media in Soviet Russia continued to be carefully controlled and coordinated. For example, on 
May 8, Kiev radio announced that schools were being closed early and young children were 
sent out of the city; but on the same day, Pravda carried a comment specifically denying that 
schools were being closed early and children evacuated from Kiev. Not until May 13 did the 
central media acknowledge this decision.90 This example perfectly echoed what Gorbachev 
had said on “not to cause a panic and even greater harm.” But an ostensible calm situation 
did not keep the civilians from the actual radioactive harm. At no point did the Soviet media 
disclose the effects of Chernobyl’s radiation on the environment of neighboring countries. No 
data were given that would allow comparison of the scale of the disaster with other nuclear 
accidents.  
Whatever efforts the Soviet Politburo had made to divert and conceal the accident 
from the civilians and the outside world, they had distracted their manpower and resources 
from what they really should do—to control the consequence of the accident to the minimum 
range, but not the release of the information to the minimum range. Meanwhile, during the 
summer of 1986, glasnost remained viable on paper and in propaganda. The Soviet 
government had highlighted the limitation of glasnost by handling and hesitating to give the 
information on the Chernobyl accident. 
For the new Russian government, a transparent information and media handling is 
important not only when emergency occurs, but is also required throughout any procedure 
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both domestically and worldwide, especially if it is about nuclear issue. According to a 
document “Key Steps in Building a New Reactor” prepared recently in January of 2009 by 
the Nuclear Energy Institute of the United States, the estimated time period for a new plant to 
put into commercial operation from the initiate planning is about 11 to 12 years91 in the U.S. 
Another document explains that a nuclear power plant is originally licensed to operate for 40 
years, and can obtain a 20-year extension of its license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) 92 . In addition, there is another 60-year limitation on the 
decommissioning of a ceased plant after its license has expired93 . Throughout this life 
expectancy of rough 130 years of a nuclear power plant, there are multiple issues need to be 
handled carefully with information transparency: site selection, design selection, application 
development and review, construction safety, operation protocol, maintenance, spent fuel 
storage and reprocessing, license renew, and decommissioning. As for Russia, there are old 
plants from the Soviet times running and phasing out, and new plants being constructed and 
proposed, all at the same time. Setting up good communications is definitely praised if 
Russia wanted to transit from old irresponsible image into a new identity of reliable energy 
superpower. 
The first firm step completed by the new government is the establishment of the state-
owned corporation Rosatom, successor of Ministry of Nuclear Engineering and Industry of 
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the USSR. Unlike its predecessor, which was a ministry administrated directly under the 
central Politburo, Rosatom has less attachment to the government in operation being as a 
state-owned corporation. This only gives the possibility of having less manipulation pressure 
from the upper leadership, but does not guarantee its willingness of releasing responsible 
information to the public. 
Further steps should be taken in various aspects. The selection of plant site is the most 
obvious procedure needs to be publicized. This issue could involve large number of 
community members and affect their daily lives even when everything is under control. In a 
macro and ideal way, the selection of a plant site is mostly based on its economic and safety 
concerns. But when think it in a micro perspective to decide the exact location within the 
region selected in the macro sense, the site selection should involve water availability and 
community concerns. The planning of a new plant site in Russia is still a procedure highly 
involved with politics, but not a community thoughtful one. 
A recent contest for a new nuclear power plant settlement between Ozersk and 
Snezhinsk served as an up-to-date example. The United States Department of Energy’s 
Moscow office reported on January 27, 2009 that a long-standing political crisis in Ozersk 
had brought tangible economic aftermaths as losing its contract on the construction of South 
Urals nuclear power plant94. While at the same time, another nearby closed city Snezhinsk 
had approached Mosow asking to register a branch of the Energoatom concern in their city, 
which would be responsible for the construction of South Urals plant and other new plant in 
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the city. Their argument is based on Ozersk’s current unstable political situation, saying that 
Snezhinsk could guarantee public consensus and constructive assistance of the local self-
government. This is crucial for attracting investment of such magnitude. 
Both cities were closed nuclear cities that were built early in the last century around 
40’s to 50’s, when they were originally named with numbers as secret regions. Many of the 
Russian plants are constructed in such region, where majority of the local population are 
plant related employees, others are mainly service personnel and descendants. With such a 
population composition, the community concern issue seems like an easy resolve, like the 
city of Snezhinsk did. But notice that many of the employees were assigned here during the 
Soviet times under central power dispatches. Though whole sets of life facilities are 
guaranteed, it is not easy for them to choose different life especially when their next 
generation are born and raised in the nuclear city. Consensus of the community could be a 
necessity of continuous political, professional, and personal life for these people. In this way, 
the community consensus could be viewed as a not fully representative, not community 
oriented decision, but affected by political choice of interests. 
In this Ozersk and Snezhinsk contest, the decision making process was mainly of 
correspondences between the Mayor of Snezhinsk, Mikhail Zheleznov, and Rosatom, 
Atomenergoprom, and Energoatom95.  There were neither public hearings nor review of 
application like the United States Nuclear Regulation commission does96. This indicated that 
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state-owned companies like Rosatom are actually set up to act more freely dodging the 
accusation of using political influence. 
There is a long way for the government of Russia to operate a transparent 
administration. This requires profound change within the system, from legislation to real 
effective election among multiple parties. Besides meeting a satisfaction of information 
transparency to the public for acceptance, the technical ensuring on a safe and guided 
operation is also important part of public acceptance on nuclear issues. The Chernobyl also 
set a negative example on bad plant operation. 
 
5.6 Financial Readiness 
 
A very direct outcome from the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents for the 
United States is that the government called on a red light on new nuclear power plants 
construction. From the Bush administration to the current Obama administration, the calling 
on nuclear renaissance has revived the willingness on government and policy support on new 
nuclear plants construction. This is well proven by the recent hearing held on March 12, 2009 
with Senators from 50 States and the new Energy Secretary Steven Chu. Nearly half of the 50 
States mentioned the nuclear issue and Senators from States like the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, 
New Hampshire, Idaho, Washington, and etc. have urgent requests on State regulations and 
policies on approving new plants licenses and funding supports. 
Funding for plant construction and operation could be coming from various ways. 
The nuclear industry shall have strong contribution to the local economy in order to attract 
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state investments and government funding allocation. South Carolina’s current nuclear power 
generation accounts for 51.2 percent of the state’s electricity, which make it the most 
successful nuclear state in the United States97. The State government is eagerly to invest in 
new nuclear plants to enhance the energy economy. And now they also have another argue 
point that nuclear can fulfill the requirement of emission remission target. 
The situation is not alike in Russia for political willingness to fund nuclear power 
plant construction and development. The Soviet government continued to allow existing 
plant construction sites to complete the constructions after the Chernobyl accident. These 
progress goals are set in those five-year plans and are set to be achieved as political goals 
eventually. Back in the Soviet times, especially during the Cold War era, nuclear power 
plants were built along with reprocessing plants that can produce weapon grade plutonium. 
Though concrete evidence is not able to be found by now, there is still high possibility to 
believe that this was also partly funded from military expenditures. The government did not 
only fund the projects with capitals, but also with intelligences and manpower. The political 
willingness of allocating investments into nuclear plant construction is high because it is first 
a national security matter rather than economy based concerns. 
But the Soviet government did consider the economy factor when thinking of 
investing more in the nuclear power industry. The Arctic region and Northern Siberia area are 
geographically north and hence habitant places in these areas need extra more energy on 
heating system than other places. The Soviet government was trying to provide them with 
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cheap and reliable heating supply system. An idea of nuclear heating was presented by Soviet 
experts at the Fourth UN Conference on Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 197198. 
But because of the rapid loss of heat in steam or water circuits, heating reactors need to be as 
close to their end-users as possible. This requirement made the idea unpopular in Western 
Europe and in the United States where anti-nuclear lobbies were strong, climates are mild, 
and the economic advantages of nuclear heating might be wiped out by the reduction in 
property values as a result of prevalent reluctance to live too close to nuclear reactors. In the 
Soviet Union these problems did not exist because the government owns all houses and the 
heating was free. As such, the government rather than the customers was interested in 
reducing the heating bill. Based on the fact that nuclear reactors have a relatively low 
efficiency on thermal energy transmission to electrical energy, it can provide more heat for 
local heating than traditional plants like coal-fired and gas plants can do. Also, nuclear plants 
require small amount of 30 tons in average of cheap fuels for annual operation. And this part 
of cost was only 15 percent of total plant operation cost, comparing to the coal-fired or gas 
plant which takes up to 70 percent. The Soviet government then invested the first heating 
reactor in the early 1970s at Bilibino, in the Soviet far north-east. The reactor was built to 
reduce the life expenses of local people and supply a mining city, where transportation for 
diesel and coal are extremely hard and expensive. Throughout the Soviet history, the 
government invested 17 such kind of reactors99. 
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We have reason to say that though the Soviet government’s willingness to invest in 
nuclear plants did not resemble the United State’s way, the funding was guaranteed in order 
to support the industry for economic, political, and military reasons. But as Russia has 
transitioned from its Soviet society into a democratic one, privatization and private 
investment became possible and actually prevailed during the first decade after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The Russian government is facing a new situation of competing with 
private investment and government investment. Another concern is to balance the interests of 
traditional power plants versus the interests of nuclear industry. 
The establishment of the state-owned corporation Rosatom has again played an 
important step against private investment invasion into this crucial industry. Rosatom took 
over all things related to the country’s civilian nuclear industry and was marketized as a 
state-owned corporation. This structure change would bring the nuclear sector of Russia more 
chances to attract private investments worldwide. Other similar changes occur in various 
fields. The military arms exporter Rosoboronexport may soon follow Rosatom and be turned 
into a state-run corporation. The national corporation on nanotechnology is likely to be set up 
following the same pattern100. 
Russia’s willingness to allocate funding into the nuclear sector is high. The reason for 
this kind of ownership change in the energy and high-tech sectors of Russia reflected that 
under high percentages of GDP growth for the recent years, the Russian government is 
eagerly to attract foreign and private investments to boost the economy. The projection of 
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Putin’s administration on nuclear power generation toward 2030 is leapfrogging from 16 
percent to 25 percent in electricity mix, 32 new nuclear power plant is planned for 2020, 44 
is planned for 2030 101 . Russia is also moving forward with steady steps to build new 
reprocessing centers in the country. Other research and potential development in the nuclear 
is the Rosatom scheme for floating nuclear power plants. With all these ambitious projections 
and develop plans, Rosatom, representing the country’s interests, will have to invest great 
amount of money into the sector.  
The political willingness to allocate funding comes from these aspects: 1) National 
security reasons. Russia is currently taking steps to decommission its nuclear weapons. But 
with the expansion of NATO and missile facilities set up by the United States in Eastern 
Europe and even Caspian region, Russia still needs to consider long-term strategy for its 
national security. Nuclear power plants with reprocessing center can secure material supply 
for potential needs of nuclear weapons. 2) Energy security reasons. With the world trend to 
switch from fossil fuel consumption to electrical energy consumption, large scale of cheap 
and steady supply for base load electricity generation is essential. Nuclear power is also more 
independent energy choice because its fuel is abundant and is not a strategic reserve for a 
country. 3) Economic reasons. Russia has large reserve of nuclear intelligence and technology. 
Its long history development can also bring foreign contracts on plant construction and fuel 
services. It is now collaborating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to 
build a reprocessing center in Arkhangelsk which will be capable of providing spent fuel 
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reprocessing for other countries. Russia has even mended its law and regulations to allow 
storage of other countries’ nuclear spent fuel on its soil in favor of this multinational 
approach reprocessing service for the global market102. Another well-know example is the 
contract between Russia and Iran on building nuclear facilities, Russia has also set up 
cooperation agreement with the United States and China103. 4) Environmental concerns. 
Nuclear power plants has the lowest green house gas emission among all kinds of power 
plants, though there were arguments for hydro plant being the lowest in emission. 
Based on these four driving motives, Russia could have high willingness to develop 
nuclear industry. In fact, Putin and Rosatom have said not only for once that Russia will 
allocate its earnings from exporting oil and gas into sectors concerning national development 
demands. Russia is currently levying about 25 percent on gas companies like Gazprom104. 
But this reallocation of capital could raise problem of balancing the interests among different 
energy sectors. Nuclear power contributes 16 percent to the country’s electricity supply 
currently, while natural gas has a percentage around 55105. Lobbying in Duma would be 
strong to keep the money for further expansion of gas industry. The 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas 
dispute has indicate that the EU is stepping into the water of pipeline construction and 
facility improvement for Ukraine. As a result, a new pact signed by the European 
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Commission, international banks and the Ukraine government outlines $3.4 billion in 
European investments in Ukraine's natural gas pipeline system 106 . This would greatly 
increase the demand for government subsidies from the gas sector to initiate the proposed 
new pipelines to Europe through Turkey. And the funding would go biased toward the gas 
companies because Russia is now counting on gas export to generate revenues for domestic 
development. 
On the other side, Rosatom is actually running short on funding for its contracts with 
domestic and foreign clients. On February 24th, 2009, Rosatom and the far northern Siberian 
Republic of Yakutiya signed an agreement to mobilize investment for the construction of four 
floating nuclear power plants for use along the Republic’s coastal areas on the Arctic 
Ocean107. The announcement of the new floating plants comes a day after Rosatom and 
Germany’s Siemens AG signed a memorandum of understanding to team up on a joint 
venture that would encompass all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, from fabricating fuel to 
decommissioning old nuclear installations. The two companies predicated their union on a 
forecasted 400 new nuclear reactors expected to be built worldwide by 2030. But Alexander 
Nikitin, director of Bellona’s St. Petersburg offices, said these things have no economic basis, 
Rosatom has no money available to fulfill these collaborations. This lack of funding is 
proven by the head of Rosatom in a speech in the industrial city of Podolsk, near Moscow, he 
indicated that, “the demand for equipment for construction in Russia of three to four nuclear 
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reactors a year will likely appear later than expected.”108 
All these evidences point to the potential lack of funding support from the 
government, who though has a relatively high willingness to fund nuclear industry. And the 
transformation of government ministry into state-owned corporation is a clear sign that 
investment attraction should be done mainly through the company. Report said that the 
corporation would be directly accountable to the Russian President who would appoint its 
board109. This tight relationship to the highest power showed that even it has been put into the 
market, the government would not want to lose control over it, and the fact that the former 
Prime Minister Sergey Kiriyenko was pointed as the first head of the corporation enhanced 
this impression. 
 
5.7 Policy Synergies and Tradeoffs 
 
Figure 9: Policy Synergies and Tradeoffs 
 
 
With the above six aspects of nuclear power related policies, plus the GDP (economy) 
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factor discussed in Chapter 4, there are seven major policies that affects the nuclear energy 
development in Russia. Among them, there are several strands of synergies that reveal the 
interactive within these policies. It is summarized in Figure 9. 
 
  
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The spine of this paper is the four dimension concept model: Oil & Gas—Economy—
Nuclear—Policy and the central element among the four is “nuclear”. The government of 
Russia is determined on developing its civil nuclear sector. They see nuclear power as a 
future strategic energy source, and are planning on building its fuel reserves and technology 
in order to become a world nuclear superpower. 
The first two elements in the model indicate that the current energy-economy 
structure of Russia is not stable as the oil and gas prices fluctuate widely; they will be unable 
to sustain a long-term domestic plus export performance; new energy form(s) should be 
developed; and all of this can result in multiple political issues. This unstable structure calls 
for the following requirements of new energy form: 1) relative stable price; 2) large amount 
of demand; 3) abundance in reserve; 4) clean and environmental-friendly in use; 5) less 
politics involved. 
A few potential sources of energy supply meet those requirements above according to 
Russia’s own situation. By doing Stakeholder and S.W.O.T. Analyses among nuclear, wind, 
and clean-coal, nuclear appears to be the best choice for expansion in Russia. This result is 
gained by quantifying detailed cost, benefit, equity, and robustness for the three energy 
choices and then comparing their overall values. This step confirms the choice of nuclear 
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power as the best option for Russia’s energy future. 
To evaluate the role of nuclear power in Russia in the future, two indicators can be 
representative, one is the percentage of nuclear electricity, and the other is the country’s total 
nuclear capacity. By using the available values into the Russian nuclear electricity output 
equation, C * H * f = O * P, the validity of the equation is demonstrated. To cross test 
whether the two indicators are consistent in the future by year 2020, with the country’s total 
nuclear capacity and the percentage of nuclear electricity projected by Rosatom, the total 
electricity output and the nuclear power plant capacity factor of 2020 will be needed in 
addition. 
To get a general idea of Russian electricity output projection, a regression model 
based on Russian GDP was developed. The highly correlated linear function between 
electricity output and GDP since Putin’s administration was adopted to project Russian 
electricity output in the year 2020. Russia’s nuclear power plant capacity factor 2020 is 
estimated from the value of current U.S. average nuclear capacity factor based on 
Energoatom’s aim of 2015. 
Rosatom revised their plan of building new plants several times since 2006, 
especially after the 2008 financial crisis. The most conservative number for nuclear power 
total capacity for 2020 was released in Fall 2009. Considering that the economy will recover 
gradually, the range created by the lowest and highest total nuclear capacity was considered 
within the realm of possibility. Therefore, Russian nuclear electricity percentage by 2020 is 
estimated to be in the range of from 21.2% to 25.9%. The Rosatom projection of 23% lies 
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between the two scenarios. This indicates that the projections of 43.3 GWe and 52.9 GWe as 
total nuclear capacity are also reasonable. 
A proper analysis of the role of nuclear power in the Russian electricity portfolio 
includes a consideration of the synergies among several important policy concerns including 
population growth, new technologies and services, uranium availability, environmental issues, 
public acceptance, and financial readiness. And although there will potentially be some 
negative factors, for example public non-acceptance of nuclear power, the comprehensive 
policy environment in Russia will provide a positive influence on further nuclear power 
development. 
In sum, nuclear energy is a necessary and efficient component for Russia’s electricity 
supply and economic development. The significant increase in nuclear power will necessitate 
the development and implementation of aggressive fuel and technology policies and an 
affirmative financial preparedness on the part of Rosatom. 
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